Recites for successful innovation
The problem of how to foster and manage technological innovation has long been of primary concern to both academics and executives. Since the late 1960s a large and still growing body of research evidence has pointed consistently to the conclusion that, for relatively small innovations at least, there is a broad correlation between the success of new product innovations and the extent to which their development is marketing or user led (Marquis, 1969; Mansfield and others, 1971; Utterback, 1971; Litvak and Maule, 1972; Rothwell, 1974; Cooper, 1975; Mansfield and Wagner, 1975; von Hippel, 1976 von Hippel, , 1978 von Hippel, , 1982 Freeman, 1982; Quinn, 1985; Georghiou and others, 1986; Cooper and Kleinschmnidt, 1987) . This is not to say that technology push has no part to play in successful innovation.
On the contrary, it has been widely recognized that a purely market-led approach can be every bit as limiting as a purely technology-driven one (Dessauer, 1971; Tauber, 1975 Tauber, , 1979 Imae and others, 1984; Voss, 1984; Little and Sweeting, 1984) . The art, as most commentators have agreed, is to combine the two; or, to use a phrase adopted in two of the key studies in the field, to ensure the "proper coupling of R&D with marketing" (Mansfield, 1971; Freeman, 1982; see also Cooper, 1975; Aram and Javian, 1973; Souder, 1977 Souder, , 1987 Rubinstein and others, 1976) .
A second and largely separate line of research has focused on the barriers to innovation experienced in organizations, and especially in large corporations, and on the characteristics of those projects in organizations in which the barriers are successfully overcome. Here the emphasis has been on two factors, the importance of which has been well demonstrated and is now generally accepted. One is the existence of product champions operating at a senior enough level in the firm to effectively sponsor the innovation and overcome any natural organizational resistance to change (Schon, 1963; Roberts, 1968; Chakrabarti, 1974; Maidique, 1980; Burgelman, 1983) . The second is a general commitment of top management to innovation, embodied 'n the practice of rewarding risk-takers and managing failure the accepted organizational goberts, 1968; Quinn and Mueller, %F Backus, 1984) .
On the basis of these consensus conclusions, a variety of recipes for the successful management of technological innovation have been put forward. Reflecting the research literature these are, broadly speaking, of two kinds. One kind, based primarily on the literature on R&D and marketing, focuses on the need for coordinating structures. In particular it advocates the use of matrix organizations for R&D or, carrying the same principle further, of a project-based organization for new product development in general, with all the main functional divisions of the organization represented in each project team. The other kind combines this prescription with a range of "cultural" imperatives drawn from the general observation of successful innovating firms and linked with the literature on champions and top management support.
Most recent recipes have been of the latter kind, and although the details have varied from guru to guru they have shared a common core of main features. The need for active collaboration between the marketing and R&D functions remains central, even if it is sometimes obscured by the surrounding cultural rhetoric. And a project-based organization is the order of the day. But beyond this there is a call for competing project teams with multiple approaches, skunk works and developmental shoot-outs. Failure is to be managed as the norm, but membership of a successful product development team is to be made into the key employee goal. Champions are to be nurtured and made into corporate heroes. Top management should be visibly committed to the innovation process, which should be a key component of a strongly pronounced corporate image. And they should also have a strong market orientation, which should penetrate and act as the driving force for the whole organization (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Pascale and Athos, 1981; Quinn, 1985; Peters and Austin, 1985; Clifford and Cavanagh, 1985; Imae and others, 1984; Roberts, 1980) . The aim, in the phrase coined by Quinn (1985) , is "controlled chaos": an environment in which all the advantages of small entrepreneurial firms are retained at the project level and corporate control is provided by the management of culture and by a pervasive awareness of and deference to the market place.
These recipes appear to work well for the exemplary firms on whose practices they are largely based. They are clearly related to the research traditions mentioned above, and they also tie in well with the recent research results of Souder (1987 Souder ( , 1988 correlating innovation success with the use of organizational commitment in place of formal controls, and with high levels of interaction and communication across traditional task boundaries. However, they leave unanswered two very basic problems. One is how to implement them. Knowing where to go is one thing, but getting there is quite another, and many firms clearly find the recipes almost impossible to enact. The other problem, underlying this practical one, is how the two sets of component prescriptions fit together: how the structural prescriptions for the coupling of R&D and marketing relate to the more general prescriptions on corporate culture.
Barriers to imolementation
The overriding problem is in implementing the required coordination between the marketing and R&D functions. Many firms would nowadays claim to be doing this effectively, and many now employ some kind of structural coordinating mechanism. But recent research results suggest strongly that such mechanisms are not working. There is still a chronic lack of understanding in industry as to how the marketing-R&D interface ought to operate. Even where there is a marketing inpur to initial project assessments, this is rarely carried through into the crucial engineering design phase. And where the marketing function is given a role in the development process it typically seeks to control that process, withholding its own information from engineers and designers, and rejecting any contributions they might seek to make outside its own imposed specifications or terms of reference (Gupta and others, 1985, 1988; Dumas, 1988; Bonnet, 1986) .
Either way, effective collaboration between marketing and R&D remains elusive.
Underlying this lack of collaboration is a lack of understanding. Researchers -have long recognized that the marketing and R&D functions are typically characterized by strongly contrasting organizational subcultures, with different values, motivations and goals, differing status structures and reward systems, and different concepts of procedure and control (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; LaPorte, 1967) . Given this context, it is scarcely surprising that members of the two functions find it very difficult to understand each other's worlds. Recent research by Souder (1988) has shown that this is indeed the case, that, in particular, they find it difficult to understand and adapt to each other's operational requirements, and that from this lack of understanding there arises a wide range of grievances and suspicions.
It should not be surprising either, given what we know about the sources of conflict between departments and functional groups, that far from resolving these differences, organizational structures which bring the two subcultures into immediate contact tend also to bring them into open conflict (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Seiler, 1963; Souder, 1977 Souder, , 1987 . Classic sources of interdepartmental conflict, such as task-related asymmetries and mutual dependencies, become more visible. And while any conflict may be overcome in some cases through the creation of a strong project identity and commitment, anything short of a very strong, and very elusive, degree of cohesion in this respect is likely to fatally compromise the organizational initiative.
Besides this fundamental problem, other interfunctional relationships, such as those between marketing or R&D and operations can also cause problems well recognized in the research literature (Quinn and Mueller, 1963; Burgelman, 1983) but scarcely addressed by the recipes for success. And the use of any project based organization in which the project teams have a high degree of autonomy faces other serious difficulties too.
To advocate the management of failure is all very well, but innovative projects and internal new ventures do have very high failure rates (Roberts, 1980; Little and Sweeting, 1984) . And research into executive attitudes to project teams and venture groups has shown that while executives recognize many advantages for such organizational structures their attitudes are dominated by persistent perceived disadvantages. They are worried about the difficulty of imposing financial control, and about excessive autonomy leading to developments that might fit into the company's overall strategy. They anticipate difficulties in finding the right people to head up the teams. In short, they are quite reasonably worried about the danger of losing control, and strongly prefer to stick to a more traditional and tightly controlled organizational structure wherever possible (Hopkins, 1975) .
In summary it would appear that, while there is a large measure of consensus on the requirements to be met if a strategy of technological innovation is to be pursued successfully, there are formidable barriers to the implementation of these requirements. And there is relatively little guidance, within the recipes for success, as to how to overcome these. You cannot imitate 3M or Sony by imitating their organizational machinery. Matrix or project based structures are not universal panacaeas. The objective recognition of the need for project autonomy, loose financial controls, and operating flexibility sufficient to allow for skunk works, spontaneously arising high-performance teams and multiple competing approaches, is far from equivalent to a subjective preparedness to acccept the loss of immediate control entailed. And above all the call for an integration of marketing with research and development, or for a combination of a strongly marketing-led approach with technological freedom, is far removed from most firms' realities of practice.
Underlying all this is a pervasive uncertainty and vagueness about what roles the different parts of-the recipes play relative to each other, and what specific functions each part serves.
The politics of innovation
The key to this dilemma is to recognize that the innovation process is, like most organizational processes, a political one. Many writers in recent years have drawn attention to the political nature of organizations, and of the managerial processes within them (Farrell and Petersen, 1982; Gray and Ariss, 1985; Mintzberg, 1985 Mintzberg, , 1987 Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985; Kotter, 1986; Pfeffer, 1981; Narayonan and Fahey, 1982; Nielsen and Rao, 1987; Hambrick, 1981; Jemison, 1981 Jemison, , 1984 . In particular the political nature of decision making processes, both in general and in the context of technological innovation, has now been thoroughly attested to and explored through a substantial body of empirical research (Fahey, 1981; Hickson and others, 1986; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; Pettigrew, 1973; Wilson, 1982; Welsh and Slusher, 1986; Johnson, 1987; Hendry, 1988; Graham, 1986) . The importance of political activity in the promotion or hindrance of change processes has also been thoroughly demonstrated (Mumford and Pettigrew, 1975; Pettigrew, 1985; Greiner, 1986; Guth and Macmillan, 1986) . And a political perspective is implicit too in the literature on innovation champions and in that on interdepartmental conflict. The political nature of the processes concerned is not however recognized in the recipes for success, and it is here that the difficulties discussed above arise.
From a political perspective, the problem of managing technological innovation is one of how to manage the collaboration betweeen rival interest groupss within the organization. Usually this will include interest groups with generally similar cultural backgrounds (and operating within the same functional divisions), but with different personal or social values or goals, different professional backgrounds, or competing political interests. Almost always it will include groups with contrasting cultural backgrounds, radically differing experiences, and different status and reward environments. If a set of prescriptions for solving the problem is to be successfully implemented, it must address this political reality, by taking full account of the political relationships between the parties involved.
In those recipes which focus purely on the organizational structure, the aim, in political terms, is to provide a mechanism for the establishment of working relationships and consensus decision making across some of the principal political divisions of the organization. This prescription relies, however, on a sense of belonging and commitment to a project being sufficient to override the conflict automatically engendered by bringing the rival interest groups into close contact. And it also fails to address the political situation outside the project or venture group, and the barriers to change that are encountered there.
One way of addressing these problems is to focus attention on methods for binding organizations together: for providing project teams with the cohesion to overcome their internal conflicts, and organizations as a whole the cohesion both to limit conflict on a larger scale and to provide an environment of trust in which project groups can be given sufficient autonomy to escape the effect of this wider conflict. And it would appear to be this approach that underlies the relative succes of the more recent culturally based recipes for managing innovation. A strong corporate image binds people together. So does a perceived commitment on behalf of top management to the innovation process. A preparedness to allow project teams to form spontaneously and the encouragement of competition between teams both serve to strengthen team bonding. Indeed the encouragement of conflict between groups (i.e. between project teams) is probably the fastest and most effective way of reducing conflict within them (i.e. between functions). And while it imposes its own problems, especially in terms of the management of failure, these are at least manageable. So long as the structure of political conflict separates vital elements of expertise, such as those held by the research and marketing specialists, nothing is manageable for there is nothing to manage. These binding effects are important. But they are also limited.
A strongly proclaimed set of corporate cultural norms informs people what is expected of them, and provides a foundation for bonding in terms of shared perceptions. But it can only act as an effective unifier if it is specific enough to direct people's behaviour, and that brings us back to our original problems. Unless there are some other means of coordinating research and marketing, for example, proclaimed cultural norms must almost inevitably favour one or the other, or be irrelevant to the innovation process. Within the framework of the existing prescriptions a corporate commitment to innovation per se can only work in conjunction with the use of autnonomous and competing project teams, and these raise the issues of control we discussed earlier. Any organization needs some form of control over its activities, and if this is not to be operated through a tight corporate structure there must be some overriding discipline, be it financially or more broadly marketing based, which will again upset the balance of the innovation process. Or else an organization must be prepared to take genuine risks. Of the exemplary companies used as the basis for existing prescriptions, many are actually market-led, and while this approach is reaping short-term harvests, its long-term viability remains open to question (Quinn and McGrath, 1985) . Others are actually risk-takers, but while it may be necessary to take risks in order to optimize the chances of survival this is an approach that is unlikely to be widely imitated, at least so long as there plDpear to be more comfortable options.
Overcoming the barriers So far as they relate to the politics of the situation at all the existing recipes for innovation success rely almost entirely on the provision of forms of corporate glue. But this is like taking a set of magnets and, instead of aligning them, trying to glue them together by their repelling poles. If the glue is strong enough they may hold together for a time, but the forces of repulsion will be undiminished. The arrangement will be unstable and instead of being put to useful work the magnetic energy will be wasted. Similarly with organizations, one can glue together rival interest groups so as to neutralise their conflicts, but it may be only at the expense of neutralising their powers too. The glue can play a very important part, but the first priority should be to remove, so far as possible, the sources of conflict. Surprisingly, despite the considerable research into the sources of conflict, relatively little has been written about their removal. In the course of some recent research on the management of new product innovations, Souder (1988) has however made some sugestions as to how this might be achieved within an organizational development setting, giving some evidence in support of a procedure which involves alternating periods of nominal (side by side) and interacting (face to face) group activities. And once we ask the right question, our knowledge of the practices of successful innovating firms produces some ready answers. In particular, many of the practices of Japanese technology-based firms appear to relate directly to our problem, without being in any way specific to a Japanese context (Ohmae, 1985; Imae and others, 1984; Pascale and Athos, 1981; Rubinger, 1985) . Drawing on these practices, all of which are mentioned, though not generally emphasized, in the existing literature, as well as on our own research into the management of technology and design and the work of Souder and others on interdepartmental conflict, we may put together a list of eight ways in which conflict might be reduced, and the barriers to innovation lessened.
Group development programmes such
as that proposed by Souder, in which the timing and extent of integration and retreat can be managed by development experts, have an obvious part to-play.
2.
3.
Common socialization processes, and in particular common training programmes for marketing and R&D recruits, should serve both to strengthen the glue of an overriding corporate culture and to reduce conflict through the provision of shared experience.
The recruitment of science and engineering graduates to the marketing function, either directly or through a period in the R&D function, should help to overcome one of the major communication barriers between the two functions, and with it a large element of mistrust and suspicion. 4.
5.
6.
7.
Job rotation programmes or similar schemes, if sufficiently widespread, should further strengthen interdepartmental understanding, both through shared experiences and through the building of personal linkages.
Strong social and recreational programmes have a part to play not only in enhancing corporate belonging but also in encouraging personal cross-functional links.
Common status and reward systems should also remove a major source of conflict. For an organization starting with a mixture of systems (by research ability, management ability, seniority, market shortage, etc), this will inevitably entail costs as some groups are paid over the previous "going rate", and may also entail some staff losses. But the costs should be mitigated by improvements in quality and should be substantially outweighed by the benefits.
Moreover, since reward systems provide one of the most visible demonstrations of the values of the organization the careful management of relative rewards should anyway be a top organizational priority.
Of crucial importance, but rarely discussed, is the role played by the design function. In some firms the presence of a design department serves merely to complicate the political situation, while in others it is virtually an irrelevance, ignored so far as possible by both marketing and R&D (Hendry and Dumas, 1988) . But given the appropriate authority it can play an important coordinating role, and indeed must do so if the product design process is to be successful. An autonomous design department, independent of the marketing function and with sufficient internal authority not to 'b be ignored by that functihcan serve both to improve %!n&-,.* product design and to speed up and facilitate the collaborative new product development process. This is also an area in which external consultants can be used to good effect, their freedom from the organizational structure allowing them to create communication channels and bonds between the different functions.
8. More ambitiously, but not necessarily impracticably so, a range of specific training and organizational development programmes might be used to change the very nature of the functions themselves, and particularly of the marketing function.
There is nothing radically new in these suggestions. All are already implemented to some extent in some firms, in the West as well as in Japan. The Japanese education system does simplify the recruitment of scientifically trained marketing and operations staff and the use of the R&D function as a staff resource pool on which other functions can draw. But there is nothing in principle to prevent Western corporations from adopting similar policies.
What all this points to is a form of organization that is marketing centred, but is nevertheless technologically literate, and more specifically design-literate, through and through. Picking up on point (8) above, this suggests a new role for the marketing function. In a recent paper, . Miles and Snow (1986) claim to identify the emergence of a new form of organizational structure designed to cope with the increasingly competitive and rapidly changing markets and technologies characteristic of the present era. These "dynamic networks" are characterised by vertical disaggregation, with market mechanisms and full information disclosure systems taking the place of the close linkages and trust characteristic of more traditional organizational forms: a move from heirarchies to internal markets. The key figures in these structures are "brokers", dealing as in a market place with the four separate constituencies of suppliers, producers, designers and distributors.
avenues of recruitment for marketing personnel. If the function is to exercise properly the powers it is being afforded in contemporary organizations, however, such changes may well be necessary.
How representative, and indeed how desirable, this model is is open to question, but it does provide a provocative extreme representation of an organization in which interfunctional linkages and trust cannot be relied upon, as is often the case in the technology-based firm.
And it prompts the question: who are the brokers? They can only be the marketing function, and if that function is to play the central role in a disaggregated organization, it should perhaps do so also in the more closely knit firm to which we are aspiring here. Several writers have recently argued strongly for an internal as well as an external role for the marketing function (Leonard-Barton and Kraus, 1985; Simmonds, 1986) , and such a role would provide a natural organizational setting for that most crucial of ingredients for innovation success, the product champion. It would seem in many respects to be precisely what is needed for the management of innovation.
As we have already noted, there are many advocates of a marketing-led approach to innovation, but these generally assume a traditional externally-oriented marketing function using its knowledge of the external market to specify development targets.
An internal marketing role implies a knowledge of the interior of the organization, including the R&D and operating functions, equal to that of the external environment. It implies, in particular, a detailed knowledge of the technological capabilities, preferences and trajectories existing in the organization, as well as of their cultural settings and political structuring. This in turn would require radically new forms of training and 
